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I argue that anarchist ideas for organising human communities could 
be a useful practical resource for Christian ethics. I demonstrate this 
firstly by introducing the main theological ideas underlying Maximus 
the Confessor’s ethics, a theologian respected and important in a 
number of Christian denominations. I compare practical  similarities 
in the way in which ‘love’ and ‘well-being’ are interpreted as the 
telos of Maximus and Peter Kropotkin’s ethics respectively. I further 
highlight these similarities by demonstrating them in action when it 
comes attitudes towards property. I consequently suggest that there 
are enough similarities in practical aims, for Kropotkin’s ideas for 
human organising to be useful to Christian ethicists.
Introduction
There has always been a radical message in Christianity that un­
dermines the importance of worldly power and wealth.1 Reception 
of this message has varied hugely across the history and geo­
graphy of the church, but it has by no means been the case that 
the full extent of its call for egalitarianism, love, inclusivity, and 
communal distribution of wealth has always remained a sidelined 
voice in the church. In this chapter, I explore the theology of one 
 1 E.g. Matt 5:1–12; Matt 19:16–24; Matt 25:34–46; Mark 12:30–31; Acts 
2:42–47
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of the greatest theologians of the early Church,2 a Byzantine monk 
called Maximus the Confessor. Whilst in his lifetime he was a vic­
tim of persecution, his theology is now upheld as orthodox in 
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Anglican churches. This makes 
him a figure of prime importance when it comes to highlighting 
the political and ethical outworking of an interdenominational 
theology for the Christian tradition.
In this chapter I present some of the foundational ideas in 
Maximus’ theology, looking at the philosophy and metaphysics 
that he draws out of scripture, and demonstrate why this results 
in what, by today’s standards, we would consider a radical ethics. 
I suggest that a useful way to try and formalise an ethical response 
to Maximus’ theology would be to draw on anarchist literature, 
especially the ideas of Peter Kropotkin. Whilst it is clear that 
Kropotkin does not share the same metaphysical commitments as 
Maximus (or any Christian theologian), the philosophical ideas 
grounding Kropotkin’s ethical response, have enough similarity 
that a Christian can (and I argue, should) look to practical anar­
chist principles like Kropotkin’s as a possible means of living out 
their Christian ethics. If there is agreement between Christians 
that Maximus is an important theologian for us today, and that 
his thought has the full radical implications I demonstrate, then 
it should also follow that at the very least, Kropotkin’s ideas for 
anarchist living ought to be considered as a mode of living worth 
pursuing.
This chapter has three parts to it. In the first, I give a short 
overview defining terminology and introducing the lives and 
contexts of Maximus and Kropotkin. In the second section 
I lay out the key theological ideas important for  understanding 
Maximus’ ethics. In the third section, I justify a similarity that 
I believe exists between Kropotkin and Maximus in their 
 understanding of human well­being and how we ought to act. 
As a result of this similarity, I then conclude that Kropotkin’s 
practical suggestions for how to live in a stateless society ought 
to be considered as a vital direction in which practical Christian 
ethics might be taken.
 2 cf. Louth, Maximus the Confessor. (London: Routledge, 1996), i.
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1. Who is Maximus and What is Anarchism?
Maximus the Confessor was born in about 580AD and died 
in 662AD. He lived under the rule of the Byzantine Empire, 
the  power ruling most of the Mediterranean and North Africa 
between 330–1204AD. Maximus, like all theologians who lived 
prior to 1054AD, lived before the East­West Schism in the church, 
making his work important within many Christian traditions. 
In academic circles, due to poor transmission of early Greek works 
to Western Europe during the medieval period and a  variety of 
other factors, Byzantine theologians like Maximus have had 
 relatively little attention. In the last hundred years,3 and especially 
the last fifty years, this has changed, and the field of Maximus 
studies is now a rapidly growing area. This attention has  inevitably 
also given rise to an interest in the ethical  outworking of Maximus 
thought, i.e. how we should live as a result of this theology.4 I mention 
below a few of the directions in which Maximian ethical scholarship 
 3 H. Von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus 
the Confessor. Daley, B. (trans.) (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988 (first 
ed. 1946)), 23.
 4 E.g. R. Bordeianu, ‘Maximus and Ecology: The Relevance of Maximus 
the Confessor’s Theology of Creation for the Present Ecological 
Crisis’. The Downside Review 127 (2009): 103–126; D. Munteanu, 
‘Cosmic Liturgy: The Theological Dignity of Creation as a Basis of an 
Orthodox Ecotheology’. International Journal of Public Theology. 4, 3 
(2010): 332–44.; E. Theokritoff, Living in God’s Creation: Orthodox 
Perspectives on Ecology. (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 
50–90; C. Brenna, ‘Orthodox Cosmology and Modern Rights Theories’. 
NY, 20–22.09.2012 (Conference paper delivered to the OTSA 2012 
Annual Meeting, available on request). T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric 
Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 225–30; T. Grdzelidze, ‘Creation and Ecology: How 
Does the Orthodox Church Respond to Ecological Problems?’ The 
Ecumenical Review. 54, 3 (2002): 211–218; G. Popa, ‘Theology and 
Ecology: Hermeneutical Insights for Christian Eco­Theology’. Journal for 
Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science. 2 (2008): 97–128; E. 
Zelensky, ‘Nature as Living Icon: Ecological Ethos of Eastern Orthodoxy’. 
Religions: Vol. Environment, 11 (2012): 167–179; J. Chryssavgis & B. 
Foltz (eds.) Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian 
Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation., Fordham: Fordham 
University Press, 2013.
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is being taken. First, however, it is worth saying a bit about who 
Maximus was.
Maximus grew up either in Constantinople with ties to the civil 
service and the imperial court, or, depending on what sources we 
use, in Palestine to a relatively poor family where he had strong 
ties to the Palestinian monastic movement.5 At some point, possi­
bly around 626,6 he abandoned all this and went off to become a 
monk in a monastery in North Africa. He was heavily influenced by 
a famous theologian and monk, Sophronius, whose lead Maximus 
would eventually follow in taking a stand in Empire­wide theo­
logical controversies. Maximus appears to have remained a monk 
his whole life, never being made a priest or bishop. Despite this, 
lay, monastic, and clerical figures from all over the empire wrote 
letters to him asking for his philosophical, theological, and spiri­
tual advice on various matters. In Maximus’ later life he famously 
wrote on the two wills of Christ, taking a theological stand during 
a time when political unity rather than theological orthodoxy was 
foremost on the imperial agenda.7 He was tried for heresy and 
treason and eventually his right hand and tongue were cut off 
(these being the tools by which he spread his heresy), and he was 
exiled to what is now modern day Georgia, where he died later 
that year on 13th August 662.8 His theology on the two wills later 
 5 Andrew Louth argues that Maximus’ familiarity with court and imperial 
proceedings along with his extensive education suggest that it is more 
likely that Maximus was born and raised in Constantinople (Louth, 
Maximus, 5). Along with Brock’s earlier observation that Palestine would 
place Maximus close to his friend Sophronius, (see Louth, Maximus, 
6–7), Pauline Allen argues that Maximus’ theology retains a distinct­
ly Palestinian ascetic flavour such as his response to Origenism and 
awareness of Neoplatonism that would be made sense of if Maximus 
was Palestinian born. cf. P. Allen, “The Life and Times of Maximus the 
Confessor”, The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor. P. Allen 
& B. Neil (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 9–14. The 
controversy over Maximus’ early life comes from two competing biogra­
phies of his life – an earlier Syriac one that hates him and a later Greek 
life that extols him.
 6 All dates from the tentative timeline reconstructed by Allen, “Life and 
Times”, 14.
 7 For further background see Louth, Maximus, 7–16.
 8 His first trial was in 655 after which he was exiled to Bizya/Thrace. His 
second trial was in 662 after which he was exiled to Lazica/Georgia. Cf. 
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became the groundwork for the sixth Ecumenical Council and 
he is now venerated as a saint in the Eastern Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran traditions.
In current theological ethics, Maximus’ theology has become 
particularly important for environmental ethics. His work pro­
vides a strong theological grounding for the integrity of all crea­
tures (including the earth itself, and plants and minerals). Radu 
Bordeianu, for example, has explored the ecological implications 
of Maximus’ work for the current environmental crises.9 This in­
cludes considering the validity of claims pointing toward Christian 
theology as partially responsible for attitudes condoning envi­
ronmental destruction. Whilst the accusation has some validity, 
Bordeianu writes that a more responsible theology has been in our 
grasp for centuries with thinkers such as Maximus the Confessor.10 
Another important contribution to scholarship on Maximus and 
ethics is a recent collection of essays that suggests how Byzantine 
theology, and in particular the work of Maximus the Confessor, 
may be a useful resource for contemporary ethics.11 In one pa­
per in this collection, Andrew Louth admits that the world has 
changed a lot since the time of Maximus: the universe is not so 
small and young as it was thought to be, and the human and even 
the Earth are much more insignificant than the Byzantine mind 
could ever conceive.12 Despite this, Maximus’ theology offers us 
a sense of ‘the coherence of all things’,13 and an awareness of in­
terrelation between the particular and the whole. It makes sense 
of how a creature might be minuscule within an enormous cos­
mos, and yet still have purpose and responsibility because of the 
choices we can make and our ability to contemplate everything 
Allen, “Life and Times”, 14–15; Louth, Maximus, 16–18; G. Berthold, 
Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings. (London: SPCK, 1985), 31, 
note 32.
 9 Bordeianu, ‘Maximus’.
 10 Bordeianu, ‘Maximus’, 103.
 11 See section ‘I. “Knowledge United to God”: Environment, Nature and 
Creation in Patristic Thought’ in Chryssavgis & Foltz (eds.), Toward. 
9–71.
 12 A. Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos in St Maximus the Confessor’ in Toward. 
Chryssavgis & Foltz (eds.), 68–9.
 13 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 70.
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around us.14 This description of the universe need not be at odds 
with our biological comprehension or scientific explanations and 
may rather enhance our understanding of the fragility of rela­
tionships within our environment.15 Louth posits that Maximus’ 
vision offers a means of combining a holistic understanding of 
the universe with a rich sense of the place of reason. The tools of 
scientific theory and mathematical expression are tools that only 
make sense to the human, no matter how universal they appear to 
be.16 In this way, the search of the human for wisdom concerning 
its surroundings is entirely compatible with the Byzantine world 
view. In Maximus’ thought, every human is logikos, rational, with 
the capacity to choose.17 This rationality is one of the greatest gifts 
to humankind, who as a result may choose to coexist and make 
peace with one another and the natural world, or, as we will see, 
cause devastation in its misuse of choice.18 Louth’s contribution is 
particularly important as a contemporary source that recognises 
that a huge shift has taken place in our perception of the universe 
as a result of our scientific advances. He rightly points out that 
we need to justify why we are looking back to a cosmological 
theology prior to these scientific advancements for advice on how 
to live in the world today. Louth’s explanation leads us to affirm 
that spiritual wisdom that asks us to live well with other creatures 
and one another is not usurped by scientific enquires but is a nec­
essary part of what it means to be human. The utility of Byzantine 
thought for the Christian is that this inquiry is not seen as apart 
from spiritual concerns, but contextualised within a wider inquiry 
into who we are and how we ought to live.
Having given an overview of Maximus and his place in 
 contemporary scholarship, I wish to define my use of the term 
‘anarchist’, and briefly justify my choice to look at Kropotkin 
in this chapter. Following Peter Marshall’s definition, I loosely 
take anarchists to be those who “reject the legitimacy of exter­
nal government and of the State, and condemn imposed political 
 14 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 68–70.
 15 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 70–1.
 16 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 70–1.
 17 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 63–4.
 18 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 68.
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authority, hierarchy and domination. They seek to establish the 
condition of anarchy, that is to say, a decentralized and self­reg­
ulating society consisting of a federation of voluntary associa­
tions of free and equal individuals”, so as “to create a free society 
which allows all human beings to realize their full potential”.19 
It is difficult to make generalisations about anarchist thought, 
given its condemnation of set political ideologies, however, one 
thinker whose ideas continue to remain important in communal 
anarchist thought is Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921). Kropotkin’s 
writings are particularly valuable for the way that they intertwine 
philosophical critique of the status quo, anecdotal and  statistical 
evidence of differing economic systems, biological evidence to 
counter the political primacy of a social survival­of­the­fittest 
idea, and pragmatic ideas for both long and short­term changes 
that can be made to society.
In Anarchy in Action, Colin Ward goes so far as to call his 
own book “an extended, updating footnote to Kropotkin’s 
Mutual Aid.”.20 Ward believes Kropotkin’s continuing relevance is 
 abundantly apparent and that, for example, “Anyone who wants 
to understand the real nature of the crisis of the British economy 
in the 1980s would gain more enlightenment from Kropotkin’s 
analysis from the 1890s than from the current spokesmen of 
any the political parties.”21 Ward identifies a severe  paucity in 
the imagination of the left, which has largely abandoned “those 
 aspirations for the liberation of work”.22 Consequently, he 
 suggests that Kropotkin’s “decentralist and anarchist vision” may 
yet hold much for us, and he claims it is certainly much less an 
“absurd” idea than a socialist faith in the humanisation of work 
through the conquest of the state power by the proletariat.23 
I have quoted Ward writing of Kropotkin’s relevance in 1973, 
1974 and 1998, but in the wake of the 2008 economic crash, 
 19 P. Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. 
(London: Harper Perennial, 1992), 3.
 20 C. Ward, Anarchy in Action. (London: Freedom Press, (1st pub 1973, this 
ed. 2008)), 10.
 21 Ward, Anarchy, 10.
 22 Ward, ‘Introduction’ in P. Kropotkin, Fields, Factories and Workshops 
Tomorrow. (London: Freedom Press, 1998 (1st ed. 1898)), 13.
 23 Ward, ‘Introduction’ in Kropotkin, Fields, 13.
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I think Kropotkin’s ideas are more important than they ever have 
been before. Following the systemic failures of state socialism and 
capitalism, Kropotkin’s ideas look ever more prophetic and at­
tractive. Most importantly for this chapter, the ethical commit­
ments underlying Kropotkin’s practical writings share much with 
the key features I identify in Maximus’ ethics, making his work a 
good potential resource for Christian praxis.
2. The Cosmic Theology of Maximus the Confessor
I outline here three areas that are important for understand­
ing how Maximus believes humans should live. I explain how 
Maximus believes the cosmos is held together (2a). This allows us 
to glimpse the way he believes all nature24 and creatures are linked 
to one another and to God, since for Maximus the universe is not 
merely a physical place, but also possesses a spiritual dimension. 
I then (2b) discuss the specific importance Maximus places on 
the human and the responsibilities that go with this importance. 
Lastly I look at what, practically speaking, Maximus believes hu­
man activity – ethics – should consist of (2c).
2a. Union and Distinction
Maximus’ theology can be understood in terms of ‘union and dis­
tinction’.25 He believes that all things will be gathered to union 
with one another in God, but will still retain their unique, distinct 
identity when they are united.26 This means that his theology is 
a delicate balance between a desire for harmony and unity of all 
things, and a dedication to the freedom and personal expression 
of every creature. Maximus writes that we deepen our knowledge 
of God by understanding and discovering meaning within one 
 24 Used here as a lay term for creation, especially non­human creation, rath­
er than in the theological sense of physis.
 25 Proposed as a systematic way of reading Maximus’ theology by M. 
Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the 
Confessor. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 26 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.1.
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another and the natural world.27 As this occurs we begin to over­
come the divisions and confusions that keep creatures at enmity 
with one another.28 Drawing on Ephesians 1:10, Colossians 1:16 
and similar passages, Maximus explores the way in which the cos­
mos is recapitulated and made whole in Christ.29 God intends all 
of creation to be drawn towards God and united in love, and God 
works towards this end continually.30 Maximus uses the example 
of travelling from the edge of a wheel down the spokes to the 
centre – in this example, creatures that move towards God (the 
centre) also move towards each other, coming closer spiritually and 
overcoming odds with each other as they are motivated by love.31 
Thus, unity, perfection and participation in God shall be reached 
when “there shall be no intentional divergence between universals 
and particulars”.32 For Maximus, the providential end for crea­
tures is to be gathered to God and all divisions overcome, while 
the identity of each creature is never at risk of being  abolished.33 
Particular creatures continue to exist, but the difference between 
one creature and the next is no longer a source of conflict, and 
is instead a cause for celebration.34 As Melchisedec Törönen ex­
plains, number is thus difference without being division,35 so that, 
just like “When we speak of a two­coloured or five­coloured stone 
(or of any multi­coloured one) we do not divide the one stone into 
two or five stones”.36 Although we can count many things in one, 
it does not make it many – and although something is one, it does 
not mean we cannot pick out the unique colours within it.
 27 Maximus, Amb. 21 1248C–D in On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: 
The Ambiguua Vol I. Constas, N. (ed.) (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2014), 434.
 28 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1313B in On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: 
The Ambiguua Vol II. Constas, N. (ed.) (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2014), 118.
 29 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308D in On Difficulties II, 106–8.
 30 Maximus, Ad Thal. 2, CCSG7:51.
 31 Maximus, Amb 7. 1081B­C in On Difficulties I, 100.
 32 Maximus, Ad Th. 2, 7:51 (Blowers (trans.), On the Cosmic Mystery of 
Jesus Christ. (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 100).
 33 Maximus, Amb. 10. 1189A in On Difficulties I, 310.
 34 Cf. Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch1.
 35 Törönen, Union and Distinction, 42.
 36 Maximus, Epp. 12 PG91 476A­C (Törönen (trans.) Union, 42).
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Maximus’ vision for the world is one where there is both per­
fect community and yet distinct personal relation that comes 
about through Christ. He writes:
For the wisdom and sagacity of God the Father is the Lord Jesus 
Christ, who holds together the universals of beings by the power 
of wisdom, and embraces their complementary parts by the sagaci­
ty of understanding, since by nature he is the fashioner and provid­
er of all, and through himself draws into one what is divided, and 
abolishes war between beings, and binds everything into peaceful 
friendship and undivided harmony, both what is in heaven and 
what is on earth, as the divine Apostle says.37
Vladimir Cvetković notes that in advocating this kind of union, 
Maximus’ cosmology “abolishes all the divisions that exist in the 
humankind, not only those established by gender differentiations, 
but also those based on national, ethnic, political, cultural, educa­
tional and any other platform”.38 In proposing that we are guided 
in the direction of union, and in the overcoming of divisions be­
tween creatures, Maximus implies that there is no place for the 
judgement, exclusion or abuse of another being on the basis of its 
difference.39 Difference is not to be a dividing factor, but a cele­
bration of intended diversity that brings creation closer together 
as it exhibits love and moves closer to its intended end in God. 
The conclusion Maximus leaves us with is that there is no place 
within the cosmos for ideological, political, racial or any other 
kind of hatred. What we hate, we divide from us, and in doing so 
also separate ourselves from God.40 What we love, by contrast is 
brought to God, who is love.41
 37 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1313B in On Difficulties II, 118 (Louth (trans.), 
Maximus, 162).
 38 V. Cvetković, ‘Maximus the Confessor’s Geometrical Analogies applied to the 
Relationship between Christ and Creation’ in P. Pavlov, et al.(eds.), Orthodox 
Theology and the Sciences. (Columbia: Newrome Press, 2013), 277.
 39 Cf. Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305C in On Difficulties II, 104; Maximus, 
Myst. TCr. Ch.1; cf Col. 3:11–15.
 40 “The one who sees a trace of hatred in his own heart through any fault at 
all toward any man whoever he may be makes himself completely foreign 
to the love of God, because love for God in no way admits hatred for man.” 
Maximus, De char. PG90 963C I.15 (G. Berthold (trans.), Maximus, 37].
 41 Maximus, De char. PG90 963B I.13.
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The existence we lead and the communities we choose to be a 
part of must therefore reject persecution and social division based 
on the differences we see in one another. An ethical exploration 
of this cosmology might lead one, for example, to question the 
necessity and utility of societal and legal divisions and borders 
that discriminate on bases such as culture, ethnicity and wealth. 
Anti­discrimination ideas are often upheld in Christian ethics by 
an appeal to human rights laws,42 but the ethical possibilities that 
could be derived from Maximus might go further than these to 
challenge more basic artificial boundaries such as those of nations 
and territorial borders. The discrimination involved in the main­
tenance of borders is particularly well illustrated in the manifesto 
of the decentralised grassroots organisation ‘No Borders’. They 
point out that the maintenance of a border elevates movement 
of people into a commodity purchasable only by those with the 
economic wealth or political power to do so. The system of de­
portation and border control targets and criminalise those who 
are poor. In this way, ‘No Borders’ write, “Modern states try to 
turn movement into a right that is granted or denied according to 
economic and political power”.43
Maximus’ understanding of union and distinction brings a fur­
ther dimension to the ethical outworking of ‘love your neighbour’ 
(Mark 12:13; Matt. 22:39). It is clear that, for Maximus, diversity 
found in different communities and cultures is a cause for celebra­
tion, and is one of the ways in which creation is brought together. 
We are many in our diversities and yet one in celebration of this 
and in our day­to­day relations of love. This means that a partic­
ular culture can be celebrated, but when that identity is exclusive, 
insular and inspires hatred for what is different instead of love in 
multiplicity, it becomes a source of division that breaks apart the 
unity of the cosmos. In my mind, it would be hypocritical to con­
sider Maximus’ cosmic theology to be a call for equality between 
 42 See for example, A. Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political: Democracy 
and Non-Radical Orthodoxy. (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2012), 128.
 43 No Borders, ‘A No Borders Manifesto’: http://noborders.org.uk/node/47 
(Accessed 20.03.14).
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the sexes44 without also considering it to be a condemnation of 
refusing asylum seekers or migrant workers entry into a country. 
Maximus’ balance between union and distinction is one that calls 
for communal care but also personal freedom through Christ­like 
love.45 This love is always about loving every particular person, 
especially the persecuted, powerless, and marginalised. Divisions 
within our society that breed hatred, alienation, or otherwise limit 
the extent to which one may love, have no place within the cosmic 
scope of Maximus’ theology.
2b. The Human as Microcosm
Within Maximus’ cosmological thought, humans play an  important 
role. With this importance, however, comes a responsibility. Humans 
possesses reason and free will. For Maximus, this means that 
humans are uniquely placed to be the voice of voiceless creation, 
and have the potential to express all creation with that voice and so 
commend the cosmos as one to God.46 Following, amongst  others, 
Gregory of Nyssa,47 Maximus understands each human to  contain 
all the cosmos within them – to be micro-cosmos.48 A human 
 partakes of and is able to contemplate both visible and invisible 
things, and is thus like a “laboratory in which everything is concen­
trated and in itself naturally mediates between the extremities of 
 44 Male and female are discussed as distinctions in humans that are over­
come in Christ. Maximus believes that prior to the Fall humans were 
without sex or gender (based on Gal. 3:28 and his reading of Genesis) 
and that procreation probably happened in a different way: (Maximus, 
Amb. 41 PG91 1305C & 1309A­1312A in On Difficulties Vol II, 104, 
110–114). See also S. Mitralexis, ‘Rethinking the Problem of Sexual 
Difference in Ambiguum 41’ Analogia: The Pemptousia Journal for 
Theological Studies 2:1 (2017), 139–144. 
 45 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B­C in On Difficulties II, 106–8.
 46 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305B in On Difficulties II, 104].
 47 “It has been said by wise men that man is a little world in himself and 
contains all the elements which go to complete the universe.” Gregory 
of Nyssa, ‘On the Soul and the Resurrection’ in Gregory of Nyssa: 
Dogmatic Treatises W. Moore & H.A. Wilson (trans.) (New York: 
Christian Literature Publishing Co. 1892), 682.
 48 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.7.
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each division”.49 Maximus believes that the human person’s unique 
possession of both rationality and sensibility50 means that they are 
capable of mediating the differences within the created order and 
bringing it into harmony and coexistence.51
Drawing heavily on Paul’s letters, in his Ambiguum 41, 
Maximus illustrates that, when humanity chose to turn away from 
God, it was the ability to mediate between God and the rest of cre­
ation that was lost to humanity.52 When Christ became incarnate 
as both God and human, he united creation with God.53 Through 
his death and resurrection Christ makes relationships between 
creation and God possible again.54 It was humanity that caused 
the fractures in the relationships between heaven and earth, and 
within creation itself. As such it is as a human that God comes to 
restore mediation and harmony.55 Humans, then, can choose to 
partake in this restored ability to mediate through Christ. We do 
so by freely choosing to try and coexist in love, bringing together 
all of creation in unity.56 When writing on the place of mediation 
in Maximus’ cosmology and its relevance for today, Louth notes:
St Maximus’s divisions of nature may seem to us quaint, but his 
idea that within the manifold that is the created order there are 
divisions that can either, when transcended, express the richness 
and beauty of the created order or, alternatively, cause gulfs of 
incomprehension, darkness, and pain seems to me an insight of 
continuing relevance.57
Louth’s exposition, which specifically refers to the theology in 
Maximus’ Ambiguum 41, makes the point that we do not have to 
sign­up to the specific philosophical and metaphysical structures 
 49 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305A­B in On Difficulties II, 102–4.
 50 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305D­1308A in On Difficulties II, 106.
 51 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305B­C in On Difficulties II, 104.
 52 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308C­1312B in On Difficulties II, 108–114.
 53 Maximus’ theology is heavily reliant on the ‘logic’ of the Council of 
Chalcedon (451) which affirmed Christ as being one person in two distinct 
natures of human and divine.
 54 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308C in On Difficulties II, 108.
 55 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308D in On Difficulties II, 108–110.
 56 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B­C in On Difficulties II, 106–108.
 57 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B­C in On Difficulties II, 106–108.
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of a Byzantine worldview in order to see value in the recogni­
tion that human choices have got the world into the mess it is 
in today. Whether we are discussing environmental destruction, 
extreme inequalities in wealth, or social, political, economic or 
cultural discrimination, exploitation and persecution, the means 
to deepening these rifts or alleviating one another from suffering 
have the potential to come from uniquely human decisions and 
choices. This is one of the many reasons that, in the Byzantine 
ascetic tradition, the question of what humans should do begins 
with a reflection on one’s own actions and the way we treat oth­
ers and the world around us.58 This, in turn, is never separate in 
the Byzantine mind from the perpetual activity of Christ and the 
Spirit in our lives and a reciprocal relationship rooted in grace and 
free will that occurs between God and the human.59
For Maximus, the ability to choose and deliberate and 
 possess rationality (logos), is a natural ability of humanity. With 
 possession of this power however comes a responsibility to the 
rest of  creation. The abuse of rationality and the divisions that 
form within our societies (between fellow humans and between 
the human and the rest of the natural world) have devastating ef­
fects. The gifts humanity has been given of grace, capacity to love 
and capacity for wisdom, are ones that come with a terrible price 
for all creation when humanity falls short of its natural ability and 
potential. This foresight in the effect of human activity within its 
own societies and upon the environment is just one of the ways in 
which Maximus’ thought might challenge the Christian concep­
tion of who we are, what might be possible, and what the failures 
to love difference imply. This cosmology proposes that, because 
we can love, we have an obligation to love. To put our rationality 
purely to self­service has demonstrably destructive consequences 
for everything touched by that choice. This is a cosmology that 
 58 See for example, K. Ware ‘Through Creation to the Creator’ & A. 
Keselopoulos, ‘The Prophetic Charisma in Pastoral Theology: Asceticism, 
Fasting, and the Ecological Crisis’ in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: 
Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation. 
J. Chryssavgis, & B. Foltz, (eds.), (Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2013).
 59 Maximus, Or. Dom. PG90 877A.
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speaks of the beauty of the whole, but also of its fragility as a 
cosmos built on interrelation.
2c. The Ascetic Practice of Love
Lastly then, let us look at what Maximus believes this cosmol­
ogy will translate into in terms of human action. We have seen 
that Maximus believes that the human is tasked with uniting the 
cosmos through their choice to love, but what does this mean 
and what does this look like? What does Maximus mean by love? 
How does one seek God’s meaning in creation, move towards 
God and mediate between creatures? Maximus answers that these 
hopes are made possible in Christ and by following him in faith 
and in the practice of love.60 To practise love is to follow the ex­
ample of the life and death of Christ.61 By grace we have faith, ra­
tional choice, the ability to mediate, and restoration in Christ, but 
we ourselves must have the voluntary inclination to eradicate the 
troubles (‘passions’) that run counter to human nature.62 We were 
made naturally good, but it is through the fall and our continuing 
choice to sin (to turn away from God, who is love) that human 
nature is occluded by passions that separate us from God.
Behind Byzantine cosmology, and also at its heart, is the as­
cetic way of life.63 Rooted in the Gospel and then developed by 
early Christian desert monks, ascetic thinking occasionally took 
the form of ‘centuries’.64 These were a set of one­hundred apho­
risms upon which one might meditate that would aid one in the 
struggle to live a practical, Christian, spiritual life. Through sim­
ple means of self­discipline and a life of love and humble giving, 
one might grow in wisdom, and begin to tread along the path in 
the Byzantine cosmic vision that brings all creation closer to har­
mony, unity, perfection, and ultimately to God. In his Centuries 
 60 Maximus, De char. PG90 975C I.27.
 61 On cultivating the mind of Christ: Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1163B II.83; 
on discerning the logoi through a pure mind: De char. PG90 981C.
 62 Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1127B II.6.
 63 Louth, Maximus, 44.
 64 P. Sherwood, The Ascetic Life and The Four Centuries on Charity. (New York: 
The Newman Press, 1955), 102; Evagrios of Pontos is credited with 
inventing the ‘century’ format of ascetic literature.
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on Love, Maximus writes four sets of a hundred statements that 
guide the reader in their search for wisdom, their internal battle 
with passions that plague them, and their struggle to live a life of 
genuine compassion and love for fellow creatures. For example, 
he writes:
If you harbour resentment against anybody, pray for him and 
you will prevent the passion from being aroused; for by means 
of prayer you will separate your grief from the thought of the 
wrong he has done you. When you have become loving and 
 compassionate towards him, you will wipe the passion  completely 
from your soul. If somebody regards you with resentment, be 
pleasant to him, be humble and agreeable in his company, and 
you will deliver him from his passion.65
Following the words of St Paul, Maximus also urges the  ascetic 
to “Rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who 
weep”.66 This is the way in which one may have the ‘mind of 
Christ’.67 By preparing one’s heart and mind this way, Maximus 
believes that one can begin to perceive real meaning in the world 
about us. As the intricacies of the created world become visible 
to us, so will we come to know God through all creation about 
us.68 Knowledge, harmony and holiness are pursued through free­
ly choosing to practice love. Love takes the form of learning to be 
merciful, patient, and kind even when someone frustrates or hurts 
us; it is a means to helping others see faults within themselves that 
they can learn from, rather than reinforcing cycles of alienation 
and hatred.69 This, I think, might be a suitable way of summing 
up ascetic practice according to St Maximus. The broader hope 
is union and reforging the relationship between the creator and 
all creation, but the minutiae takes place in the simple life of the 
human person, who, in possessing rationality, may choose to live 
in such a way that brings peace to those around them.
 65 Maximus, De char. PG90 1043D III.90 (Louth (trans.), Maximus, 39).
 66 Maximus, De char. PG90 1043D­1045A III.91; Romans 12:15.
 67 Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1163B II.83.
 68 Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1161CD II.79; 1161D­1164A 80.
 69 Contemplation of the logoi in Maximus’ writings is discussed in relation 
to contemporary ethics in D. Bradshaw, ‘The Logoi of Beings in Greek 
Patristic Thought’ in Toward, 9–22; Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 59–71.
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At its simplest, this cosmology is an exposition of the need to 
practice love in the human life. Love, as defined by Maximus with 
reference to Paul, is Christ­like love. It is the challenge that re­
quires the humility of the self and giving to the other. As Maximus 
writes, “The one who loves God surely loves his neighbour as 
well. Such a person cannot hold on to money but rather gives 
it out in God’s fashion to each one who has need”.70 The ethi­
cal implications of such a love are already being teased out by 
Maximus here. Love equates to seeing the suffering of others 
as the suffering of Christ, and to giving to others as Christ has 
 given to us. This naturally means that money and possessions go 
to those who need them. Accumulation of property and wealth 
are thus deeply problematic and sinful acts.71 Maximus has begun 
talking of the economic relationships that result from this love, 
but we can also think about the requirements of such love on our 
 political relations. In an ethics where personal care for the other 
is paramount, the structures of a system that maximises personal 
profit at the expense of others becomes unacceptable and incom­
patible with an entire Christian worldview. David Harvey gives 
us a concise overview of what he believes a neoliberal agenda to 
be, writing that it “proposes that human well­being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade”.72 Dedication 
to preserving an individual’s right to wealth and property brings 
about an attitude that cannot hope to comprehend love as the 
basis of economic relation. The telos of love73 in Maximus’ ethics 
 70 Maximus, De char. PG90 965B I.23 (Berthold (trans.), Maximus, 37).
 71 i.e. Acts that separate us from God, because they are unloving. The prob­
lem of property is discussed further in 3b. Positions on Property.
 72 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), 2.
 73 The telos of the ethical life for Maximus is theosis, perfect union with 
God, in which we still remain distinct persons. Since God is love, and we 
have a very practical demonstration of this love in Christ’s life and death, 
we do not lose anything by simply calling the telos of Maximus’ ethics 
‘love’. For a full discussion of the telos of Maximus’ ethics, see ‘Chapter 
2: A Telos of Theosis’ in my doctoral thesis Revolution in the Microcosm: 
Love and Virtue in the Cosmological Ethics of St Maximus the Confessor. 
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brings it into direct confrontation with ideologies grounded in 
capital accumulation and protection of private property. If we 
took giving to those in need as the basis of our economic and 
political theories and relations, we would have to radically re­
structure the economic systems and policies of any current capi­
talist state. If in any of our activities, whether on an individual or 
collective basis, we perpetuate the economic, political and social 
oppression of someone elsewhere on the globe, we have by defini­
tion a lifestyle that is deeply problematic for anyone who consid­
ers love to be integral above all else. Maximus’ cosmic and ascetic 
theology points Christian ethics in a direction that seriously calls 
into question the basic premises of any society that runs counter 
to a requirement of love.
3. Ethical Commitments in Maximus and Kropotkin
Next I turn to look at Kropotkin’s ideas and some of the  possible 
compatibilities these might have with Maximus’ thought. In 
 particular I examine the way that Kropotkin’s practical ideas for 
society may be useful resources when extending Maximus the 
Confessor’s ethics to the present day. I first consider the philo­
sophical and anthropological underpinnings of Kropotkin’s anar­
chist theory. For there to be grounds for a similar ethical praxis 
(means), there must be a semblance of a shared goal (end/telos). I 
have already intimated that a shared metaphysical telos will not 
be apparent in Maximus and Kropotkin’s ethics, but I suggest 
here, that the vision for human life on earth is underpinned in 
both Maximus and Kropotkin by the same kind of philosophical 
principles. I examine the concepts of mutual aid and well­being in 
Kropotkin’s thought and compare this to Maximus’ understand­
ing of love – arguing that the character of these concepts is similar 
enough to be valuable grounds for ethical praxis. Following this, 
I discuss their positions on private property as a way into con­
sidering the commonalities in their bases for human  economic 
relationships. Lastly, I look at some of Kropotkin’s practical 
(PhD diss., Durham University, 2018) (Available online: http://etheses.
dur.ac.uk/12376/1/Brown_Dewhurst­_Revolution_in_the_Microcosm.
pdf?DDD32+), 63–92.
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suggestions for an anarchist society and indicate how these might 
be useful developments for those who use Maximus’ theology as 
an ethical basis today.
3a. Mutual Aid and Well-Being
In his autobiography, Kropotkin describes how from a young age 
he was deeply distressed by the inequality, injustice and oppression 
inherent in serfdom, and the expectations in social interaction this 
system enforced.74 As the son of a wealthy landowner, he tells of 
the horror he felt at the way that serfs were treated in his father’s 
household. After one incident when he was about ten years old, 
Kropotkin wrote of the following encounter:
Tears suffocate me, and immediately after dinner is over I run out, 
catch Makár in a dark passage, and try to kiss his hand; but he 
tears it away, and says, either as a reproach or as a question,
“Let me alone; you, too, when you are grown up, will you not 
be just the same?”
“No, no, never!”75
From then on in his memoirs, Kropotkin describes a continual 
struggle to confront the injustices he found in Russian society. 
Remaining at the heart of his struggle is the desire to give to those 
in need, to bring a measure of fairness into the lives of those 
about him and above all “not be just the same” as the privileged 
who kept others enslaved. He claimed it was no good wanting to 
change society simply through the idea of the ‘right to work’ or ‘to 
each the whole result of his labour’.76 What had to be at the heart 
of desire for change in human society was hope for ‘well­being 
for all’,77 based on a principle of ‘to every [wo/]man according to 
[her/]his needs’.78 It was in this way that common people could 
 74 P. Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist. (New York: Dover Publications, 
1971 (1899 (1st ed.))), Chapter VIII, 48–62.
 75 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 51.
 76 P. Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread. (Milton Keynes: Dodo Press, 
1892), 10.
 77 Kropotkin, Conquest, 11.
 78 Kropotkin, Conquest, 24.
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become “the builders of a new, equitable mode of organisation of 
society”.79
Kropotkin justifies his belief in the need for a society that seeks 
the well­being of all by locating a driving factor for this in an 
evolutionary tendency of the natural world towards co­operation. 
He notes that while the traditions and history of a society play an 
important part in the development of ethics, conscience itself “has 
a much deeper origin, – namely in the consciousness of  equity, 
which physiologically develops in man as in all social animals 
. . .”.80 He writes that a key factor of evolution has been the social 
development and ability of animals to co­operate with one anoth­
er in order to survive.81 He calls this the ‘mutual­aid tendency’, 
believing it to be something more base and instinctive than human 
feeling and sympathy. For him it is a kind of natural propensity 
for solidarity, “an instinct that has been slowly developed among 
animals and men in the course of an extremely long evolution, 
which has taught animals and men alike the force they can bor­
row from the practice of mutual aid and support, and the joys 
they can find in social life”.82 At face value, there appear to be a 
number of similarities between this mutual­aid tendency toward 
co­operation and Maximus’ claim that to love is natural and in­
volves voluntarily giving, sharing and caring for others. However, 
we have quite an explicit quotation from Kropotkin claiming 
that it is not enough to say that human society could be founded 
on ‘love’.83 To address this accusation it is important to situate 
Kropotkin’s thesis, Mutual Aid, in its context.
Mutual Aid was a vital work of its time, challenging the legit­
imacy of emerging social Darwinism at the end of the nineteenth 
century and proposing that cooperation, as well as struggle, had 
foundations in evolutionary science.84 Social Darwinism exacer­
bated the struggle of the individual in nature and derived from it a 
 79 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 379.
 80 P. Kropotkin, Ethics: Origin and Development. (Montréal: Black Rose 
Books Ltd., 1992 (1922 1st ed.)), 338.
 81 P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. (Boston: Extending 
Horizons Books, 1902), xvi.
 82 Kropotkin, Mutual, xiii.
 83 See Kropotkin, Mutual, xii–xiii.
 84 Kropotkin, Mutual, ix–x.
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series of natural facts about the capability of the human and from 
there a legitimacy in the way in which human societies operated.85 
Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid really set about challenging the premise 
that the struggle of the individual is all that can be found in na­
ture (or in Darwin’s theory, for that matter).86 However, the extent 
to which ethics should be informed by observing nature was not 
called into question. This makes sense of why, for Kropotkin, it is 
not enough to say that human society could be founded on ‘love’, 
though the concept for him is a nonetheless important emotion 
derived from this natural ‘mutual­aid tendency’.87 Kropotkin still 
holds that scientifically proven tendencies in human nature must 
dictate the shape of our societies.88 Of course, this does not really 
explain why it could not be possible for the human, which believes 
itself to have developed the capability to love, to base its societ­
ies upon such a relation. Kropotkin writes, “It is not love of my 
neighbour – whom I often do not know at all – which induces me 
to seize a pail of water and to rush towards his house when I see 
it on fire. . .”.89 But need it not be? The heart of Byzantine ascetic 
literature is the assertion that the human can precisely cultivate 
an attitude of love toward any neighbour, even one previously not 
known.90 Since we are able to cultivate such an attitude, we have 
a responsibility to live in this way, Maximus believes, as we are 
the only creatures on earth who have sufficiently developed the 
rational capacity to live in such a fashion and thus enable harmo­
ny between all creatures.91
Whilst the semantics may be debated, it is clear that Maximus’ 
depiction of love as the foundation of human relationships does 
not sit at odds with Kropotkin’s hope for ‘well­being for all’. We 
have in both Kropotkin and Maximus, a concept that extols the 
importance of particular free will and identity, whilst recognising 
 85 Kropotkin, Mutual, ix.
 86 See Kropotkin, Mutual, viii–xii.
 87 See Kropotkin, Mutual, xii–xiii.
 88 Cf. Chomsky’s doubt on the utility of this kind of thought in anarchism 
see, Chomsky, ‘Interview with Ziga Vodovnik’ in Chomsky on Anarchism. 
B. Pateman (ed.) (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005), 240.
 89 Kropotkin, Mutual, xiii.
 90 Maximus, De char. PG90 964C I.15.
 91 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B­C in On Difficulties II, 106–8.
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that we are also naturally social creatures who ought to care for 
one another’s well­being and give to one another according to the 
needs of each. Kropotkin’s scientific reasoning, although appear­
ing to conflate normative and descriptive accounts of evolution, 
is certainly not a boundary to the Christian seeing utility in his 
ideas and practices. A key part of Byzantine cosmology is that it 
is not only human well­being that is sought for, but the well­being 
of the entirety of nature, of which humanity is a part. ‘To every 
man according to his needs’ might be a key slogan of nineteenth 
century Marxist and anarchist thought, but the sentiment is much 
older and one of the places it was cultivated as a way of life was 
in the practical ascesis of Christian desert monasticism: “. . . in 
God’s fashion to each one who has need”.92 To give to another 
person is to do the work of God, according to the Gospel and 
early church.93
3b. Positions on Property
In examining Maximus and Kropotkin’s positions on property, 
we can see philosophical principles become ethical directives. 
Property is matter we become attached to, regardless of whether 
we need it, and often at the expense of another human who goes 
without as a result of our attachment. It is thus an ideal topic to 
focus on when looking at how a theoretical dedication to love or 
well­being94 takes on a practical ethical dimension.
The anarchist position on property is often summarised in 
Proudhon’s famous slogan ‘Property is Theft!’.95 The practicality 
 92 Maximus, De char. PG90 965A I.23 (Berthold (trans.), Maximus, 37)].
 93 John 15:13.
 94 In using these concepts side­by­side I do not mean to imply that Maximus’ 
‘love’ and Kropotkin’s ‘well­being’ should be used interchangeably. As a 
result of (3a), I think we have sufficient grounds to consider them similar 
ethical principles or ends, and thus to us to think of them as approxi­
mately equivalent in the context of inquiry into ethical praxis.
 95 P. Proudhon, ‘Property is Theft’ in No Gods, No Masters. D. Guerin (ed.), 
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 1998), 48–54; We can find this sentiment also ex­
pressed in early Byzantine theology. Basil of Caesarea writes “Is not the 
person who strips another of clothing called a thief? And those who do 
not clothe the naked when they have the power to do so, should they not 
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of this position however seems better expressed by Kropotkin. 
“What we want is not the redistribution of overcoats,” writes 
Kropotkin, but “. . . the day when the worker in the factory 
produces for the community and not the monopolist – that day 
will see the workers clothed and fed.”96 More important than 
who owns what possession is the creation of an environment in 
which the human person may live without being in want. The 
capitalist mentality and the ‘middle­class rule’, as Kropotkin calls 
it, has a “morality drawn from account books, [and] its ‘debit 
and  credit’ philosophy, its ‘mine and yours’ institutions” must be 
 demolished.97 The threat of Kropotkin’s anarchism is that “we will 
do our utmost that none shall lack aught”.98 Thus for Kropotkin, 
property is a resource, necessary for keeping humans alive and 
ensuring human well­being. When it is seized and commandeered 
by one class to keep another in subjection, human well­being is 
obfuscated by the violent greed of those in power. Or to borrow 
the words of St Basil of Caesarea:99
It is as if someone were to take the first seat in the theatre, then bar 
everyone else from attending, so that one person alone enjoys what 
is offered for the benefit of all in common – this is what the rich 
do. They seize common goods before others have the  opportunity, 
then claim them as their own by right of preemption. For if we all 
took only what was necessary to satisfy our own needs, giving the 
rest to those who lack, no one would be rich, no one would be 
poor, and no one would be in need.100
be called the same? The bread you are holding back is for the hungry, the 
clothes you keep put away are for the naked, the shoes that are rotting 
away with disuse are for those who have none, the silver buried in the 
earth is for the needy. You are thus guilty of injustice toward as many 
as you might have aided, and did not.” Basil of Caesarea, ‘I Will Tear 
Down My Barns’ in On Social Justice. C.P. Schroeder (trans.) (New York: 
St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 69–70.
 96 Kropotkin, Conquest, 33.
 97 Kropotkin, Conquest, 156.
 98 Kropotkin, Conquest, 39.
 99 c. 329–379 AD, one of the Cappadocian Fathers – the great theologians 
of the early Church.
 100 Basil of Caesarea, ‘I Will Tear Down My Barns’ in On Social Justice. 
Schroeder (trans.), 69.
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Kropotkin’s position on property comes straight out of his com­
mitment to human well­being and the presence of the mutual aid 
tendency. How we distribute resources, and also how we struc­
ture our relationships is informed by Kropotkin’s commitment to 
his ethical principles. Hierarchies of power and class, and divi­
sions into mine and yours, disrupt not just an immediate ability 
for those in want to access what they need, but also entrench 
isolation, alienation, and exploitation in human societies. For 
Kropotkin, rethinking these relationships makes sense sociologi­
cally and anthropologically speaking. For the Christian, to give 
to the other and to overcome division in human society and the 
natural world is draw near to God and to fulfil human potential 
as made possible by Christ.101
Following in the footsteps of the Acts of the early church,102 
desert ascetics prior to and during the Byzantine empire were pro­
ponents of communal property. I wish to draw attention to the 
mindset that such an understanding of property perpetuated. This 
is point made by Maximus,103 but I think the following story from 
the sayings of the Desert Fathers and Mothers illustrates it better:
There were two old men who dwelt together for many years and 
who never quarrelled.
Then one said to the other: “Let us pick a quarrel with each 
other like other men do.”
“I do not know how quarrels arise,” answered his companion.
So the other said to him: “Look, I will put a brick down here 
between us and I will say ‘‘This is mine.’ Then you can say ‘No it is 
not, it is mine.’ Then we will be able to have a quarrel.”
So they placed the brick between them and the first one said: 
“This is mine.”
His companion answered him: “This is not so, for it is mine.”
To this, the first one said: “If it is so and the brick is yours, then 
take it and go your way.”
And so they were not able to have a quarrel.104
 101 Matt. 25:34–40.
 102 Acts 2:42–47.
 103 Maximus, De char. PG90 965A I.23; 965C I.26.
 104 J. Wortley (ed. & trans.) The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers: A 
Select Edition and Complete English Translation. ‘The Quarrel’, N.352/17.26
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The politics of possession, property and coexistence are all ex­
pressed within the ascetic life that treats the act of love as a life­
style and set of choices made in order to live like Christ. The story 
of these two old men reflects on what it means to be holy and to 
truly be at peace with another person. Not only are one’s actions 
to be unhurtful, but one’s entire attitude is to be cultivated to 
the point where to take when another needs becomes an utterly 
nonsensical and bizarre notion. Possession and property hold no 
value in an ethos where meaningful relation is expressed through 
giving. It does not matter whose brick it is, rather that it be given 
to the one in need and that the object not become the source of 
conflict between two people who might otherwise live in peace. 
Our economic relations, I think, are often the basis of our social 
relations and attitudes. To live in a society where protection of 
private property and free trade are paramount is to set an expec­
tation for social relations built upon these ideas. Our perceptions 
of value and our interactions with others are built upon deserve, 
merit and right, rather than a comprehension of compassion and 
the needs of others.
Both Kropotkin’s anarchism and Christian desert monasticism 
seem to share an understanding that along with the economics 
of giving and communal living, there must be a change in our 
mindsets and consequently our social relationships. Although 
there are many differences between the kind of communal living 
Kropotkin imagined and that of the monastic movements in the 
early church, there are certain similarities in the kinds of changes 
both communal ideas required of people. Both require not merely 
a relocation of objects but a change in the conception of how 
property rules our relationships, and how attachment to wealth 
should never come before a dedication to the well­being of anoth­
er person. The categories of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ were as common 
in Byzantine cities as they were in 19th century capitalist states 
and allowed no space for the prioritising of people rather than 
the acquisition of things.105 What Kropotkin’s communalism and 
some desert monastic practices share, is a turning upside down of 
 105 On this see Basil’s sermons ‘To the Rich’ and ‘I Will Tear Down My Barns’ 
in Social Justice. Schroeder (trans.), 41–71.
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the idea that accumulation of material possessions has to do with 
merit, and a positive disregard of any practices that do not focus 
on the integrity and well­being of the human being.106 What is 
really required is a change in our priorities, so that instead of our 
ultimate aim being an ideal of, say, the distribution of property, 
we instead dedicate ourselves to the well­being of all and giving to 
each according to their needs.107 Outside of some present­day mo­
nastic communities, there now seems very little emphasis on either 
the economic or socio­political implications of property within 
the Christian tradition. Whilst Christianity has its own history 
of communal living and property,108 it may be that the modern 
anarchist movement will serve as a reminder in this regard, that 
neoliberal and capitalist attitudes toward property are incompati­
ble with a genuine concern for the welfare of others.
3c. The Practicalities of a Stateless Society
Having demonstrated that there are key philosophical principles 
shared between Kropotkin and Maximus when it comes to anar­
chist ‘well­being’ and Christian ‘love’, I present some of Kropotkin’s 
practical suggestions that may be of use in Christian ethics. As a 
result of his dedication to human well­being, Kropotkin presented 
ideas for anarchist organising as an alternative to exploitative so­
cietal structures premised on inequity of power and wealth. Given 
the similarities that have been explored, I believe the methods for 
organising Kropotkin suggests, can be a place of inspiration to 
 106 For the desert monastics this was also about a spiritual well­being, since 
such attachment to material possessions also distracted from attention to 
God. The rejection of worldly goods was a rejection of the wealth of the 
world, so that an ascetic might instead focus on spiritual wealth. Spiritual 
wealth was concerned with good spiritual practice, good spiritual rela­
tion with God, and good spiritual relation with human and non­human 
creation.
 107 Which may entail the distribution of resources, or the means of produc­
tion being in the hands of workers, but these things are important only in 
so far as they are part of an ethics that works toward human well­being.
 108 For example see the writings of Pelagius, 15; Joachim of Fiore, 36; John 
Ball, 41; Winstanley, 128 in A. Bradstock & C. Rowland (eds.) Radical 
Christian Writings: A Reader. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002).
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Christian practical ethics as well. I believe that the ethical prin­
ciples present in Byzantine ascetic Christian theology have much 
more in common with Kropotkin’s ideas for a stateless society, 
than the exploitative structures of present­day states. Although 
the writings of Maximus, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil of Caesarea, 
and the desert fathers and mothers had a much more personal 
and introspective dimension, they fundamentally discuss the char­
acter and structure of personal relationships. When asking what 
it means to live in a community structured upon those personal 
loving relationships, I believe a good set of practical suggestions 
can be found in the works of Kropotkin, who at the end of the 
day, has a vision for human living that is very familiar to Christian 
ethics.
Kropotkin’s vision is that life be led in communities that freely 
cooperate with one another, and that the freedom of each never 
be compromised or subjugated. Human relations must be based 
upon free agreement, he proposes. There must be “a society of 
equals” so that it becomes “an organism so constructed as to 
combine all the efforts for procuring the greatest sum possible of 
well­being for all, while full, free scope will be left for every indi­
vidual initiative”.109 By nature of being a community built upon 
free relation,
this society will not be crystallised into certain unchangeable 
forms, but will continually modify its aspect, because it will be 
a living, continually evolving organism; no need of government 
will be felt, because free agreement and federation take its place 
in all those functions which governments consider as theirs at the 
present time, and because, the causes of conflict being reduced in 
number, those conflicts which may still arise can be submitted to 
arbitration.110
Community cannot be static because relation is not static. The 
needs of one human differ from another, and a society must have 
the flexibility to serve the needs of each as well as the needs of 
many. Kropotkin suggests a society built on federated communi­
ties, where people might regulate their own local communities, 
 109 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 398.
 110 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 399.
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so that “society will be composed of a multitude of associations, 
federated for all the purposes which require federation” and “all 
these will combine directly, by means of free agreements between 
them, just as the railway companies or the postal departments of 
different countries cooperate now, without having a central rail­
way or postal government, – even though the former are actuated 
by merely egotistic aims”.111 Kropotkin considers ways in which 
industry, agriculture, and social organisation might realistically 
exist without reliance on the perpetuation of poverty or the op­
pression of fellow humans. The kind of critical thinking he en­
couraged questioned the necessity of any system built upon the 
subjugation of another being. His ideas therefore comprise practi­
cal ways in which people might cooperate with one another with­
out exercising coercive power.112 The political critique Kropotkin 
proposes is that cooperative community and mutual aid are a bet­
ter root of human society than accumulation of wealth for the self 
and the few and coercive defence of private property. Since hu­
mans can mutually co­operate, Kropotkin’s ethics ends up saying, 
humans should mutually co­operate.
Kropotkin’s theoretical ideas for the structure of an anarchist 
society are inseparable from his concern for the human condi­
tion. His ethics does not shy away from radical socio­political 
and economic conclusions and is demonstrative of how an ethics 
of human relation must resolve itself into a new vision for hu­
man society. We can see this for example within his work, Fields, 
Factories and Workshops, which was first collected into a book in 
1899.113 In this work, Kropotkin outlines four aspects of his an­
archist vision. The first is the decentralisation of industries which 
allows us “To return to a state of affairs where corn is grown, 
and manufactured goods are fabricated, for the use of those very 
people who grow and produce them,” so that “Each region will 
become its own producer and its own consumer of agricultural 
produce”.114 The second looks at the possibilities of agriculture, 
and how the market garden might be put to good use. The main 
 111 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 398–9.
 112 Kropotkin, Mutual, 223.
 113 Ward, introduction to Kropotkin, Fields, iv.
 114 Kropotkin, Fields, 40.
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point of this section is to illustrate that it is always within our 
means to produce food locally to feed a population.115 On this, 
he says, “The obstacles against it are not in the imperfection of 
the agricultural art, or in the infertility of the soil, or in climate. 
They are in our institutions, in our inheritances and survivals 
from the past – in the ‘Ghosts’ which oppress us”.116 His point is 
that our cultural, traditional, political and economic practices are 
tied to our current institutions and prevent us from attempting 
to create local, self­sustaining economies and agriculture. In his 
third section, Kropotkin discusses the necessity of “producing for 
the producers themselves” and also the healthy need for all peo­
ple to be involved to some degree in manual outdoor labour.117 
On a similar theme, the last area Kropotkin covers is education: 
“‘Through the eyes and the hand to the brain’ – this is the true 
principle of economy of time in teaching.”118 Kropotkin is keen to 
emphasise that understanding of the theoretical comes through 
the practical, and that this is true in school­learning, but also in 
the societies that we construct. We cannot understand labour un­
less we labour.119 In Fields, Factories and Workshops, Kropotkin 
demonstrates the need for our economic and political decisions 
never to occur in isolation from our social and ethical thought. 
The two belong to one another and inform each other and are 
built on one another.
Of particular note in terms of compatibility with Maximus’ eth­
ical vision, is Kropotkin’s concern that “society will not be crys­
tallised into certain unchangeable forms”120 so as to best reflect 
and grow with the needs of its citizens. The understanding that, 
in Ward’s words, “there is no final struggle”121 but that our rela­
tionships – personal and communal – must be continually worked 
at, is one that recognises that we are demanding the impossible. 
 115 Kropotkin, Fields, 103; This is still the case today with responsible chang­
es to land use and diet, cf. S. Fairlie ‘Can Britain Feed Itself’ The Land 4 
Winter (2007–8): 18–26.
 116 Kropotkin, Fields, 106.
 117 Kropotkin, Fields, 158.
 118 Kropotkin, Fields, 175.
 119 Kropotkin, Fields, 186.
 120 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 399.
 121 Ward, Anarchy, 37.
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In always setting our sights higher, we keep our communities 
from stagnating into what is easy, and require ourselves to al­
ways seek better ways to live in compassion with those around us. 
One of the principle metaphysical differences between Maximus 
and Kropotkin, is that for Maximus, ultimately our life on earth 
is directed towards God, whilst Kropotkin’s ethics is thoroughly 
rooted in human aims and ends. Although this is a key difference 
between these two thinkers, practically speaking, it could be an­
other place of comparative similarity. For Maximus there is no 
completion point in which our ethical responsibilities are done. 
Ethics is human choice to seek love and knowledge i.e. to seek 
God. There is always more to learn about God and more ways 
to grow in love. Even then in theosis, the end hope of all creation 
for final rest in God, we still anticipate ever­moving rest,122 a rest 
in which relationship continues to ever deepen. In our lives here 
and now, we can thus also see for Maximus a dedication to the 
idea that human relationship rooted in love, is a relationship that 
must continually grow and recognise its own shortcomings. As a 
practical ethical principle, the idea that there is not one set end for 
human society, but that we must continually and consciously seek 
to revise our communities into places where particular and com­
munal well­being can flourish, is one both startlingly anarchist 
and Byzantine in character.
Conclusion
Thus we can see that there is a potential compatibility between 
the ethical vision proposed by Maximus the Confessor and the 
practical means of coexistence proposed by Kropotkin. While 
Maximus’ thought is firmly rooted within a Christian cosmos, 
and sees both the origin and end of things as being in God, the 
ethics necessitated by his theology is very close to a number of an­
archist considerations. The love of Christ explored by Maximus is 
one that upturns a status quo that places value on wealth, power, 
and coercion. In exploring the spiritual significance of rooting our 
actions in love, Maximus presents us not just with a vision for 
 122 Maximus, Ad Thal. 59 CCSG22 line 131.
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7th century ascetic living, but also an ethics that identifies care for 
fellow creatures as the root of economic and political relation. In 
likewise identifying Kropotkin’s ideas as politico­economic theo­
ries that stem from social concerns, we can see that common care 
for the well­being of others necessarily challenges us to rethink 
the structures of the societies and institutions in which we live. 
The divergence in philosophical frameworks between Maximus 
and Kropotkin does not mean there cannot be agreement as to 
what good human living looks like, and consequently a shared 
vision of how to create a better human society.
In the process of describing the utility of anarchist theory to 
Christians who wish to make use of Maximus’ thought, my hope 
is that this chapter will make some contribution towards self­ 
criticism within the Christian faith, and a wider interest in the 
lessons that can be learned from others similarly dedicated to the 
well­being of the marginalised and down­trodden. I hope it has 
also become clear to those of us who identify as anarchists, that 
many of the political and historical problems associated with the 
church, are not expressive of all theology underlying the Christian 
faith. This is a theology that is not just limited to the faith of the 
apostolic era (as implied by Kropotkin),123 nor to the Byzantine 
era, since it is very much alive today in theological study and also 
in different denominations of the church.
So long as giving to each according to their need is paramount to 
human activity, which I think both Maximus’ concept of love and 
Kropotkin’s dedication to well­being both affirm, there is much 
hope to be had for united practical endeavour. At the very least, 
there is certainly a lot in the practical ideas put forward by an­
archists like Kropotkin, that can be explored further in Christian 
ethics as an alternative to complicity in societal structures that 
have no place for the love of Christ. Christ’s love challenges the 
foundations of nationalisms, racisms, classisms, sexisms, and any 
other hatreds and division. It is this specific character of love that 
Maximus suggests is fundamental to a theological cosmology that 
asks who we are as humans and where we are going. This theol­
ogy sits in firm contradiction to societies and ideologies built on 
 123 Kropotkin, Ethics, 120–1.
To Each According to their Needs 89
the glorification of wealth and power, so at the very least, it seems 
important to explore the radical alternatives set forward by think­
ers like Peter Kropotkin.
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